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1Entrepreneurs' gender and financial constraints:
evidence from international data
Abstract
This paper studies gender discrimination against entrepreneurs by ¯nancial
institutions. Based on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS) that covers ¯rms in several countries of Western Europe as well
as in the transition countries of Eastern Europe, our analysis suggests that female-
managed ¯rms are less likely to obtain a bank loan compared with male-managed
counterparts. In addition, there is some evidence that female entrepreneurs are
charged higher interest rates when loan applications are approved. Disaggregation
of the sample by country groups suggests that these results are driven by ¯rms in
the least ¯nancially developed countries of the region.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, gender, ¯nancial constraints.
JEL: G21, J16, L26.
21 Introduction
The entrepreneurship and ¯nance literature has long suggested the existence of ¯nancial
constraints implying the inability of ¯rms to raise external ¯nancing in order to fund all
desired investments (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988)). Recently, a few studies have raised the question of whether the ¯nancial con-
straints facing entrepreneurs di®er in terms of demographic groups, including gender.
This interest was largely motivated by the well-documented importance of access to ¯-
nance for the creation, and subsequent performance, of ¯rms (e.g., Taylor (2001)) and
by evidence of noticeable di®erences in self-employment and business ownership rates
among men and women, start-up sizes, and ¯nancing patterns of their businesses. As
surveyed in Carter and Shaw (2006), females constitute a disproportionally small share
of self-employed, run smaller businesses, are less likely to rely on venture capital and
their ¯rms have lower debt-equity ratios.
A crucial question, especially from the policy perspective, is whether the observed
di®erences between males and females in the use of ¯nancing arise due to supply-side
discrimination against female entrepreneurs or can be explained by other factors. Dis-
crimination, whether the Becker-type or the statistical-type,1 implies that ¯nanciers'
decisions on loan application di®er for men and women who have similar creditworth-
ness and other relevant characteristics. The discrimination hypothesis is challenged by
alternative explanations that emphasize di®erences in other characteristics of male and
female entrepreneurs, such as human capital, personal wealth and risk aversion. These
may stem from the experience of entrepreneurs in other markets, as in the case of wealth
(lower employment rates and lower pay among females are widely documented), or may
be determined by nature (risk aversion). For example, higher risk aversion of women
(e.g., Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998)), implies, ceteris paribus, lower demand for bank
loans by female-owned ¯rms.
The link between gender and access to ¯nancing can be studied using two approaches
from the literature on ¯nancial constraints. One is based on data from household sur-
1See Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973).
3veys and identi¯es the constraints from the e®ect of personal wealth on the probability
of being self-employed. While useful for detecting the existence of constraints, this ap-
proach has certain limits. In particular, it does not allow di®erent dimensions of ¯nancial
constraints, such as the probability of obtaining a loan and loan interest rate, to be con-
sidered. Moreover, with this approach it is impossible to take into account di®erences
in the types of businesses chosen by men and women. Therefore, few studies that focus
on the gender aspects of ¯nancial constraints adopt this framework (e.g., Georgellis,
Sessions and Tsitsianis (2005)). Another approach to the study of ¯nancial constraints
relies on ¯rm-level data and identi¯es these constraints from credit applications, loan
denials, interest rates charged, and other similar indicators (e.g., Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo
and Wolken (2002)). Few such studies are currently available, and most report no con-
vincing evidence of gender-based discrimination. Moreover, the bulk of these studies is
based on US data, while evidence from other regions of the world remains scarce.
This paper adopts the second of the approaches mentioned to investigate whether
female-owned businesses face more severe ¯nancial constraints than male-owned ¯rms.
Among the di®erent sources of external ¯nancing, we restrict our attention to bank
loans as representing the most important overall source of external funds for small ¯rms
(Berger and Udell (1998)). Thus, the hypothesis that banks discriminate against female
entrepreneurs is at the heart of our study.
We explore gender discrimination against entrepreneurs using the Business Environ-
ment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) that has been conducted by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and World Bank since
1999. The survey has been implemented in 34 countries, mostly the transition states of
Central and Eastern Europe, but also in some countries of Western Europe and Asia.
The survey covers ¯rms of di®erent ages and is not restricted to recent start-ups. The
data provide key ¯gures about the ¯rms, such as ownership, competition, performance
and management. The survey also contains a large section on ¯nancing that allows
various proxies of ¯rms' ¯nancial constraints to be constructed.
This paper o®ers three main contributions to the literature. First, it sheds light on
4the issue of gender-based discrimination against entrepreneurs outside of the US which
is still scarce. Second, the paper o®ers a comparative perspective on the link between
entrepreneurs' gender and ¯nancial constraints by exploiting the cross-country nature of
the BEEPS dataset. In particular, we are able to relate the evidence from the mature
market economies of Western Europe that have well-developed ¯nancial sectors to that
from the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe where ¯nancial systems
are less developed. Third, in our analysis we pay speci¯c attention to sample selection
issues. In doing so, we take advantage of the rich information on ¯rms available in the
BEEPS, including variables that may be interpreted as measures of enterpreneurs' risk
aversion.
Our empirical analysis ¯nds some evidence of discrimination against female en-
trepreneurs in the entire sample of ¯rms. This result is obtained after controlling for
important characteristics of ¯rms that are related to their creditworthiness and perfor-
mance. Speci¯cally, we ¯nd that female-managed ¯rms have 5.4 percent lower probabil-
ity of receiving a loan than male-managed ones. Furthermore, we ¯nd that the former
pay higher interest rate than the latter do. As to the regional dimension, the results
here are mixed. The only substantial evidence of gender-based discrimination comes
from the CIS countries.2 The new member states of the EU, which acceded in 2004, and
the countries of South-Eastern Europe, in contrast, do not exhibit any visible discrimi-
nation. We relate these results to the substantial di®erences in the ¯nancial development
across the European countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review.
Section 3 describes the data and sample. Section 4 presents methodology and empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2CIS stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States and embraces 11 of the 15 constituent
states of the former Soviet Union.
52 Literature review
Many studies indicate the existence of ¯nancial constraints for both small businesses
and large listed ¯rms. For large companies, the evidence comes from the corporate
¯nance literature that has established a ¯rm link between internally generated cash
°ows and investment levels (Fazzari et al. (1988), Hubbard (1998)). For new start-ups,
the evidence mostly comes from the studies that focus on the impact of personal wealth
on the propensity to become an entrepreneur (Evans and Jovanovic (1989); Holtz-Eakin,
Joulfaian and Rosen (1994); Lindh and Ohlsson (1996); and Blanch°ower and Oswald
(1998)). The reason behind ¯nancial constraints is information asymmetry which makes
it di±cult for capital providers to assess and price the risk of loan applicants. As a
result, providers of capital choose a rationing strategy (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)).
There is small but growing literature investigating whether ¯nancial constraints per-
taining to entrepreneurs di®er across demographic groups. Given the well-known im-
portance of external ¯nance for the creation and operation of businesses, some authors
study whether the lower rates of self-employment and lower rates of business ownership
among minority groups, which are widely documented, are driven by unequal access to
external ¯nancing. A large group of these investigations focuses on the role of race,
ethnicity and gender as determinants of credit applications, loan denials, interest rates
charged, and other dimensions of restricted access to ¯nance (Bates (1991), Cavalluzzo
and Cavalluzzo (1998), Bostic and Lampani (1999), Raturi and Swamy (1999), Caval-
luzzo et al. (2002), Blanch°ower, Levine and Zimmerman (2003), Storey (2004), Caval-
luzzo and Wolken (2005)). Essentially, these works raise an important question about
discrimination against borrowers who belong to various demographic groups.
Discrimination in the credit market occurs when lenders' decisions on loan appli-
cations are in°uenced by personal characteristics - such as gender and race of the en-
trepreneurs - that are not relevant to the transaction. In the well-known model of dis-
crimination by Becker (1957), discrimination arises due to the taste-based preferences of
the lender so that he is willing to pay a price in order not to be associated with certain
groups of borrowers. Becker (1957) also notes that such discrimination tends to vanish
6with competition in the relevant market as lenders are no longer able to bear the cost
of the non-economically motivated choices. An alternative statistical model of discrim-
ination suggests that, as long as borrowers' demographic characteristics are correlated
with their creditworthiness, lenders may use the former as a proxy for the risk factor
associated with loans. This occurs when lenders cannot observe the risk factors or do
not collect relevant information due to the costs involved (see e.g., Phelps (1972) and
Aigner and Cain (1977)).3
Empirical testing for discrimination in the credit market is usually implemented in
a multivariate regression framework with dependent variables that characterize access
to or cost of loans and independent variables that describe borrowers' characteristics,
including demographics. In this framework, evidence of discrimination is found if the
coe±cients on the gender, race or ethnicity variables remain statistically signi¯cant after
controlling for applicants' solvency and creditworthiness. Such an approach has several
pitfalls. The major issue is the di±culty of controlling for all possible factors that are
used by lenders in assessing the quality of borrowers and which are potentially correlated
with the demographic characteristics of the latter. As a result, estimates may be biased
due to omitted variables. There are also sample selection issues: dependent variables,
such as loan denials, collateral requirements and interest rates, are not observed for all
¯rms in a random sample. Some entrepreneurs may not need a loan and this may be
related to the demographic factors. For example, there is compelling evidence that risk
attitude and risk tolerance are not the same between the genders: women tend to be
more risk averse than men (Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Barber and Odean (2001),
and Dohmen, Falk, Hu®man, Sunde, Schupp and Wagner (2005)). As a result, female
entrepreneurs prefer to invest smaller amounts of personal wealth and to maintain lower
debt-equity ratios in their businesses, possibly avoiding borrowing altogether.
Most of the existing empirical studies provide some evidence of bankers' discrimi-
nation against entrepreneurs from di®erent demographic groups. The strongest results
are obtained for racial discrimination, especially for black entrepreneurs. For exam-
3Besides demographic characteristics, discrimination may be based on other factors, such as private
versus public ownership of ¯rms (Brandt and Li (2003)).
7ple, Bostic and Lampani (1999) report di®erent approval rates for white-owned and
black-owned ¯rms, but no statistically signi¯cant di®erences between white-owned ¯rms
and ¯rms owned by Asians and Hispanics. Blanch°ower et al. (2003) also ¯nd that
black-owned ¯rms face obstacles in obtaining credit that are unrelated to their credit-
worthiness. The picture is less clear with respect to the gender-based discrimination.
Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) ¯nd evidence of a credit access gap between ¯rms owned by white
males and white females with female denial rates increasing with lender concentration.
In contrast, Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998), Blanch°ower et al. (2003), Storey (2004)
and Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) ¯nd no statistically signi¯cant e®ect of gender. With
the exception of Storey (2004), all the above-mentioned papers present evidence for
the US; moreover, they use the same dataset, the National Survey of Small Business
Finances, though not necessarily the same waves. The studies di®er, however, with re-
spect to the indicators of restricted access to ¯nance, sets of independent variables and
econometric speci¯cations. For example, Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) pay particular
attention to the role of entrepreneurs' personal wealth in explaining loan denial rates.4
The above discussion suggests a scarcity of the available evidence on gender-based dis-
crimination against entrepreneurs. Most of the previous research has been implemented
using the US data and little is known about other countries.5 The virtual absence of
international evidence is remarkable and needs to be addressed. Such international ev-
idence would also be more valuable if it were based on similar survey instruments and
empirical methodologies, thus allowing easy comparisons across countries. Overall, there
is a scope for cross-country analysis which may provide more rigorous evidence of gender-
based discrimination against entrepreneurs. In the next sections we use cross country
data to explore credit treatment by banks of male and female business owners/managers.
4There is a related strand of literature that considers discrimination in the mortgage credit market
(e.g., Gilbert (1977), Munnell, Tootell, Browne and McEneaney (1996) and Ladd (1998)). LaCour-Little
(1999) and Turner and Skidmore (1999) o®er reviews of these studies.
5There are many studies of the e®ect of gender on access and cost of external ¯nancing in the
management literature, but most of them are purely descriptive and rarely based on representative
samples.
83 Data and sample
3.1 BEEPS overview
This study is based on the data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey (BEEPS), an establishment level survey conducted by the EBRD and
World Bank since 1999. As suggested by the name of the survey, it was originally in-
tended to study the business environment, mostly in the transition countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. It was extended in 2004 and 2005 to include a range of compara-
tor countries from Western Europe and East Asia. The interviews with ¯rm managers,
besides focusing on a set of business environment indicators, also provided key ¯gures
about the ¯rms, including ownership, gender of the principal owner, whether the owner
is the manager, as well as ¯gures for the degree of competition, sales, inputs, and some
other characteristics.
We use the two most recent waves of the survey, BEEPS-2004 covering 4,453 enter-
prises in seven countries: Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, South Korea and
Vietnam and BEEPS-2005 covering 9,655 enterprises in 26 transition countries in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and also Turkey. The earlier waves of the survey, BEEPS-1999
and BEEPS-2002, are left out as they do not provide information on the gender of the
principal owner/manager of the ¯rm.
The BEEPS survey samples were constructed by random sampling from a national
registry of ¯rms or equivalents. The ¯rms covered were drawn from industry and services;
the distribution between these sectors was determined according to these sectors' relative
contribution to the GDP in each country. The sample does not cover ¯rms operating
in sectors subject to government price regulation and prudential supervision (banking,
electric power, rail transport, and water and waste water). As to size, companies that
had 10,000 employees or more were excluded from the sample, as were the ¯rms that
started their operations in 2002 or later. Like the population of ¯rms in countries all
around the world, around 90 percent of the sampled ¯rms are small and medium sized
enterprises. The details of the sample characteristics can be found in the respective
9reports on sampling and implementation provided by the EBRD.6
The strengths of the survey are the use of a consistent survey instrument across
a large number of countries and the inclusion of a large set of 3-year retrospective
questions. The main weakness of the BEEPS is the small sample size for individual
countries stemming from the wide coverage and ¯nite budgets of the surveys. Even in
the 2005 round of the survey { by far the biggest { most country samples have fewer than
400 ¯rms. The implication is that a high degree of disaggregation of the data is fraught
with systematic di®erences across countries being swamped by noise in the data. In
our analysis we therefore retain a considerable degree of aggregation of the data across
countries.
3.2 The sample
Both the overall design of the BEEPS and the exact wording of the gender question
dictate a speci¯c procedure for selecting a sample that would be appropriate for the
analysis of gender-based discrimination against entrepreneurs. To ensure a focus on
entrepreneurs, we immediately exclude from the BEEPS dataset those ¯rms where the
largest owner was represented by general public, legal persons and the government,
keeping only those enterprises where the largest shareholder is an individual or fam-
ily. Moreover, as the questionnaire is not very precise about intra-family allocation of
ownership and decision making in the family-owned ¯rms (the gender question in the
BEEPS refers to the principal owner or one of the principal owners of the ¯rm), we drop
family-owned ¯rms and focus only on those where the largest owner is an individual who
has a majority stake (at least 50 percent stake in the enterprise). Then, we restrict the
sample to the ¯rms where the individual is also the manager. By following these steps
we keep only individually-owned ¯rms with no separation of ownership and management
and with a clear indication whether the principal owner (and the manager) is a male
or a female. Since the 2004 and 2005 vawes of the BEEPS cover ¯rms created before
2002 only, in our empirical analysis we focus on the period between 2002 and 2005 and
6http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm, as available in May 2007.
10exclude ¯rms that provide no information on loan applications for these years.7
In the resulting sample, the number of ¯rms in each country varies from 48 in Geor-
gia to 484 in Poland. As the average number of observations per country (162) is too
small for a meaningful country-level analysis, we aggregate the data into four country
groups: mature market economies (members of the EU before the 2004 enlargement
- Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), new member states of the EU (the
countries that joined the EU in 2004 - the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro)
and the CIS countries (the former USSR except for the Baltic States).8 We drop Korea,
Turkey and Vietnam as these countries cannot be attributed to any of the groups con-
structed. The ¯nal sample contains 5,022 observations of which 1,358 are from the old
members of the EU, 1,178 from the new member states (2004 enlargement), 803 from
the SEE region and 1,683 from the CIS countries. Female-owned businesses constitute
26.7 percent of all the ¯rms in the constructed sample. The variation across the regions
is not very high: 27.0 percent in the old members of the EU, 29.¯ve percent in the new
member states of the EU, 21.9 percent in South-Eastern Europe and 26.7 in the CIS
countries.9
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Gender and ¯nancial constraints: evidence from the BEEPS
It is worthwhile starting the analysis with the self-evaluation by managers of ¯nancial
constraints facing their ¯rms. The BEEPS asks managers to answer two relevant ques-
tions. One is how problematic is access to ¯nancing (e.g., collateral requirements) and
the other one is how problematic is cost of ¯nancing (e.g., interest rates and charges).
These are evaluated using a scale from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle). In the
7In particular, the ¯rms that obtained their most recent loans before 2002 are excluded.
8Note that the BEEPS does not cover Turkmenistan.
9Hereafter, we proceed without using any country weights.
11entire sample, the answers indicate that female entrepreneurs face somewhat less severe
constraints than their male counterparts: 2.22 versus 2.27 for access to ¯nancing and
2.47 versus 2.49 for cost of ¯nancing, but the di®erences are not statistically signi¯cant
at conventional signi¯cance levels in a double-sided t-test. Analysis at the country group
level, however, reveals very diverse patterns. In South-Eastern Europe, female-owned
¯rms report fewer constraints in access and cost of ¯nancing than male-owned busi-
nesses do (2.20 vs 2.46 in access to ¯nancing, the di®erence is statistically signi¯cant at
¯ve percent level, and 2.54 vs 2.73 in cost of ¯nancing, signi¯cant at 10 percent level).
Female entrepreneurs also appear to be less ¯nancially constrained in terms of cost of
¯nancing in the new member states of the EU (2.57 for females vs 2.69 for males, sig-
ni¯cant at 10 percent level). However, cost of ¯nancing represents a greater constraint
for female-owned businesses in the old member states of the EU: 2.32 vs 2.18 and the
di®erence is signi¯cant at ¯ve percent level. Figure 1 provides the details. Note that
these data refer to all types of ¯nancing and not only bank loans.
A di®erent picture emerges from the answers to the questions about the actual share
of bank loans in ¯nancing of ¯xed investments. On average, female-owned ¯rms turn out
to have smaller fraction of bank ¯nancing than male-owned ones, 6.8 versus 10.8 percent
(the di®erence is signi¯cant at one percent level). In contrast, the share of retained
earnings is higher in female-owned ¯rms, 75.7 versus 68.¯ve percent. As Figure 2 shows,
this pattern is observed in all the regions.
Evidence on ¯nancial constraints can also be obtained from information on loan
applications and approval/rejections by banks. The BEEPS instrument collects infor-
mation about the most recent loans received and also asks the ¯rms that had no bank
loan why they did not use bank ¯nancing. As long as ¯rms reported no need for a loan
as the sole reason for the absence of bank ¯nancing (without mentioning other options
such as too tough collateral requirements, high interest rates, fear that an application
for a loan would not be approved), we classify these ¯rms as having zero demand for
bank loans. The complementary group consists of ¯rms that applied for the ¯nancing
and those that did not apply because they were discouraged.
12The data suggest that 62.4 percent of male-owned, and 57.7 percent of female-owned,
¯rms in the entire sample needed a loan. The pattern that females have a lower need for
bank ¯nancing than males is observed in all the regions, apart from the CIS countries,
where the relation is the opposite. Among those ¯rms that needed a loan, 43.¯ve percent
of male-owned, and 55.9 percent of female-owned, ¯rms had none because their applica-
tions were rejected or because they were discouraged from applying.10 These numbers
suggest quite a signi¯cant di®erence in terms of gender in the probability of obtaining a
loan - more than 12 percent. Large di®erences in terms of gender in the share of ¯rms
that obtained a loan are visible in all the regions, see Figure 3 for details.
We now check whether, when granted a loan, female-managed ¯rms face less favorable
contractual terms than male-owned counterparts. The BEEPS data show a di®erence in
the interest rates paid by male- and female-owned ¯rms in South-Eastern Europe and
in the CIS countries (Figure 4). However, evidence concerning di®erences in the size
of collateral, terms of loans and number of days needed to obtain a decision for a loan
application is less suggestive of gender-based discrimination. Figures 5-7 provide the
details by region.11
Basic characteristics of the ¯rms sampled are summarized in Table 1 - Table 4. Table
1 gives the de¯nitions of variables and basic descriptive statistics for the entire sample,
Table 2 disaggregates these by gender and Table 3 - Table 4 summarize the data by
gender and region. Note, in particular, that the female-owned ¯rms tend to be smaller
and younger in both the entire sample and all the constructed regional sub-samples.
Overall { while providing some support for the discrimination hypothesis { a simple
descriptive analysis of gender-based bias in external ¯nancing fails to establish a clear
pattern. Analysis in the multivariate framework that accounts for confounding factors
and, possibly, sample selection is needed. The next section describes the econometric
strategy that we employ to investigate gender-based discrimination against entrepreneurs
by banks.
10Among those ¯rms that wanted a loan, but did not get it, outright rejections constitute just a small
fraction, less than ¯ve percent.
11These data are cleaned of outliers (one percent of the number of observations).
134.2 Econometric models
The ¯rst question our study addresses is whether the probability of getting a loan de-
pends on the entrepreneurs' gender. Obviously, the loan may be obtained only by those
¯rms that had non-zero demand for bank ¯nancing. However, a straightforward analysis
based on a subsample of ¯rms with non-zero demand for loans may be inappropriate as
it ignores potential sample selection.12 In what follows, therefore, we consider the binary
response model with sample selection introduced by de Ven, Wynand and Van Praag
(1981).13
To test our hypothesis we specify the following main equation:
Prob(Loani = 1) = ©(® + ¯Femalei + °Xi + ²i) (1)
where Loan equals one if a ¯rm received a loan between 2002 and 2005 and zero oth-
erwise; Female is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the manager of the ¯rm is a
female and zero otherwise; and X is a vector of ¯rm speci¯c characteristics.
Vector X combines variables that characterize creditworthiness of the ¯rm from the
banks' viewpoint. In general, the decision to grant a loan and its contractual conditions
(e.g., the interest rate) crucially depend on the associated risk and the availability of
collateral. These, however, are not directly measured in the BEEPS and we therefore
proxy them by the share of sales coming from the main area of business activity (this
measures the diversi¯cation of a ¯rm, and hence, risk) represented by variable Concentr
and with a binary variable for single establishment ¯rms, variable Single (the idea is
that ¯rms with several establishments may be better able to provide collateral for a
loan).
In addition, vector X contains two measures of ¯rm performance (lagged capacity
utilization and pro¯tability dummy), a dummy for many (4 and more) competitors facing
the ¯rm in 2002, age of the ¯rm in 2002, a dummy that equals unity if the ¯rm was
12It is plausible that ¯rms that do not need bank ¯nancing (e.g. because they generate enough cash
themselves) would be more likely to get a loan had they applied. We also know that females, due to
their higher risk aversion, are less likely to apply for bank ¯nancing.
13Similar econometric strategy was used by Cavalluzzo et al. (2002), but they considered selection
into loan application.
14created in the former communist economies before 1990, a dummy for ¯rm location in
a big city (either a capital or a city with more than 1 mln inhabitants), ¯rm size in
2002 (measured by log employment) and sector dummies.14 We also include country
dummies.
The selection equation distinguishes between the ¯rms that needed a loan and those
that did not:
Prob(Needi = 1) = ©(~ ® + ~ ¯Femalei + ~ °Xi + ~ ÃZi + ~ ²i) (2)
where Need is equal to one if a ¯rm needs a loan and zero otherwise; and Z is a vector
of variables that identify the selection equation (instruments). The model comprising
equations (1) and (2) also assumes that ² » N(0;1), ~ ² » N(0;1), and corr(²; ~ ²i) = ½. If
½ 6= 0 then the standard probit model without selection produces biased estimates.
In vector Z we include three variables: percent of sales (1) and percent of workforce
(2) reported to tax authorities as well as a dummy variable for subsidies received by the
¯rm (3). The intuition behind these instruments is the following. The former two can
be considered as measures of the entrepreneurs' risk aversion. Indeed, more risk-averse
owners/managers would be reluctant to underreport sales/workforce in order to save on
taxes as detection of underreporting is subject to ¯nes. We also assume that more risk-
averse managers would have a lower demand for bank loans. This is exactly what the
BEEPS data show: both variables are correlated with the demand for loans - ¯rms that
needed a loan reported lower percentages of sales and workforce than their counterparts
with zero demand for loans. The numbers are 88.2 percent versus 90.3 percent for sales
(the di®erence is signi¯cant at 1 percent level) and 89.6 percent versus 92.8 percent for
employment (again, signi¯cant at one percent level).15 The dummy for ¯rms receiving
subsidies is introduced on the grounds that these ¯rms are more likely to be in need of
external ¯nance.16
14De¯nitions of the variables and their descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 1 -4.
15Consistent with the interpretation of these variables as measures of risk aversion is the fact, that
in the BEEPS data, female-owned businesses report higher percentages of actual sales and labour than
male-owned ¯rms. The respective numbers are 89.6 vs 88.8 for sales and 91.9 vs 90.5 for labor.
16The exclusion of the intruments from the main equation is justi¯ed by the fact that banks do not
observe the relevant factors.
15The second question we address is whether female-owned businesses are charged
higher interest rates than male-owned ones, other things being equal. Our analysis is
conditional on ¯rms that received loans.17 The model is speci¯ed with the interest rate
variable on the left-hand-side and a number of covariates, including the female dummy,
on the right-hand-side. We consider the following regression equation:
Interesti = ® + ¯Femalei + °Xi + ²i (3)
where Interest is the reported interest rate of the current loan, and X is a vector of
controls. Compared with equation 1, the list of regressors includes additional variables
- a dummy for collateral, a dummy for loans denominated in foreign currency and a
variable for the term of the loan measured in months. We also include time dummies
for years 2002{2005 in order to account for changes in the level of interest rates over the
period.
4.3 Results and discussion
Table 5 gives results for the entire sample of the ¯rms. Column (1) shows Heckman probit
estimation results for the model described in equations (1) and (2). It reports marginal
e®ects estimated around mean points.18 The coe±cient on variable Female, which is of
major interest in this study, is negative and signi¯cant. This result is consistent with
the hypothesis that female-managed ¯rms have a lower propensity to receive a loan. In
particular, female-managed businesses appear to have 5.4 percent lower probability of
getting a needed loan than businesses managed by males. Relative to the proportion
of ¯rms that received loans (53.4 percent), this is a fairly large number, indicating a
substantial di®erence in ¯nancial constraints for male and female managers.
17As discussed above this may be fraught with sample selection problems. Similar to Cavalluzzo et al.
(2002) we attempted the Heckman selection correction for the sample of ¯rms that had non-zero demand
for bank loans (distinguishing between the ¯rms that obtained a loan on the one hand and those that
were discouraged from applying or whose application was rejected on the other hand). However, we
found little evidence of sample selection, and, therefore, stuck to the OLS model as more parsimonious.
The Heckman estimation results are similar and are available from the authors on request.
18Estimation of marginal e®ects around median points suggests similar results.
16Estimation results also suggest that pro¯table and large ¯rms are likely to have
lower ¯nancial constraints; the latter result is consistent with ¯ndings of Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994), who report that small ¯rms face greater di±culties in securing external
¯nancing than large ¯rms.19 Regression results also indicate that ¯rms operating in
more competitive environments are less likely to obtain a loan. This is consistent with
the view that competition increases ¯rms' demand for ¯nancial resources and ampli¯es
the level of ¯nancial constraints (Povel and Raith (2004)).
The selection equation (2) is statistically signi¯cant.20 The coe±cients on the in-
struments have the expected signs (negative for the risk aversion measures and positive
for the subsidy variable) and are signi¯cant at one percent level. The negative and
statistically signi¯cant value of ½, the correlation coe±cient of the error terms in the
main and selection equations, suggests a negative selection: ¯rms that need a loan have
characteristics that make them less likely to get one.
Column (2) of Table 5 shows results for the e®ect of gender on the level of interest
rates. Regression estimates imply that female-owned ¯rms on average pay 0.6 percent
higher interest rates than male-owned ones. They also show that the interest rates are
lower for longer term loans and those denominated in foreign currencies. As regards
the last result, it may simply re°ect high in°ation rates in a number of less developed
countries covered in the BEEPS.
Table 6 reports results from estimating the binary response model with sample se-
lection for the four regions. It appears that, compared with male-owned ¯rms, female-
managed ¯rms have smaller chances of getting a bank loan in the CIS countries, the
di®erence being 8.7 percent. However, the regressions suggest no statistically signi¯cant
e®ect of gender on ¯nancial constraints in the old member states of the EU, new member
states of the EU and countries of South-Eastern Europe. This means that the result
obtained in the entire sample of ¯rms was driven by ¯rms in the CIS region.
Similar to the results from the full sample, we ¯nd that better performing and larger
¯rms are more likely to get loans. The regional-level analysis also indicates negative
19See also Carpenter, Fazzari, Petersen, Kashyap and Friedman (1994) or Lizal and Svejnar (2002).
20The estimation results are available from the authors on request.
17selection in the model, though not in South Eastern Europe (the correlation coe±cient
is large, but not statistically signi¯cant).
Results from estimating the interest rate model for the country groups are shown in
Table 7. The ¯gures suggest that female-owned businesses pay about one percent higher
interest rate than male-owned ones in the CIS countries; the result is signi¯cant at ¯ve
percent level. In the sample of the old members of the EU, the coe±cient on Female
variable is smaller but still marginally statistically signi¯cant at 10 percent level. The
same coe±cient estimated on the sample of the South-Eastern European countries is
large, but not statistically signi¯cant.
To summarize, our analysis of the BEEPS data provides some evidence of gender-
based discrimination by ¯nancial institutions. This is visible in a univariate analysis
and also holds in a multiple regression framework after controlling for industry, age,
size, performance and other characteristics of ¯rms and also after accounting for sample
selection.
The region-level results provide little evidence of discrimination in the more devel-
oped countries and considerable evidence in the least developed region, the former USSR.
Our tentative explanation for this remarkable pattern stresses two factors: the di®er-
ence in historical, cultural and institutional conditions that shape the role of women in
the society and the economy, and the di®erent level of ¯nancial development across the
states. The cultural and institutional di®erences may a®ect the magnitude of the \taste
for gender discrimination" across the countries. The latter may be particularly high in
the Central Asian states due to the long history of Islamic tradition.21
Huge di®erences in the ¯nancial development across the BEEPS countries are ap-
parent. Leaving aside the developed economies, the EBRD indicators of the progress of
21We are aware of some studies claiming that, due to the experience of gender equalization policies
during the communist period, the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe may actually ex-
hibit less gender-based discrimination than the mature market economies. Some authors, when speaking
about entrepreneurs, go so far as to suggest that \the socialist system may have ... actually created
more opportunities for women than the more democratic western one" (Pistrui, Welsch, Wintermantel,
Liao and Pohl (2000). It should be noted that such conclusions are often based on evidence from Central
Europe (the study cited refers to East and West Germany) and may have much less relevance for the
former USSR).
18banking reform in the transition countries show substantial variation. While in 1989 all
these countries started with the index of banking reform equal to 1.00 (little progress
beyond establishment of two-tier system), by 2006 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic had the highest score possible (4.00),
implying full convergence of banking laws and regulations with the Bank of International
Settlements standards and provision of a full set of competitive banking services. At
the same time, Belarus and Turkmenistan have not made any improvements since the
beginning of the transition period.22
There is a link between the level of ¯nancial development and the severity of ¯nancial
constraints: the degree of competition in the national ¯nancial markets (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2004), Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2006)). Therefore,
the fact that we ¯nd evidence of gender discrimination in the least ¯nancially devel-
oped countries is perfectly consistent with Becker's view on discrimination: competition
among providers of capital should reduce the scope for their discriminatory behavior.
Our results are broadly in line with the ¯ndings of Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) that show
a link between the level of lender concentration and a credit access gap between female
and male entrepreneurs.
5 Conclusion
Financial constraints may be a crucial impediment for starting up new businesses and for
the survival of existing ¯rms. In this paper, we present new evidence on the relationship
between the gender of managers/owners and access to external ¯nancing. Ours is one
of the ¯rst studies in this area, and it di®ers from others in that we (i) present new
evidence from the European continent, (ii) apply sample selection techniques to the ¯rm
level data, (iii) take a comparative perspective and identify the gender bias in ¯nancing
among di®erent groups of countries with various degree of ¯nancial development.
Speci¯cally we use the BEEPS dataset to test the presence of gender-based dis-
crimination against entrepreneurs by banks. We consider two indicators of ¯nancial
22See also Berglof and Bolton (2002) for a discussion of the ¯nancial development in the region.
19constraints: the probability of obtaining a loan and the interest rate charged. The re-
sults of our analysis are consistent with the hypothesis of discrimination against female
entrepreneurs. Firms that are managed by females have 5.4 percent lower probability of
receiving a loan, and pay 0.6 percent higher interest rates. Disaggregation of the sample
by country groups suggests that these results are driven by ¯rms in the least ¯nancially
developed countries of the region. As long as di®erences in the ¯nancial development
imply di®erent degrees of competition in ¯nancial markets, our results are perfectly con-
sistent with Becker's view on discrimination: competition among providers of capital
should reduce the scope for their discriminatory behavior.
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24Table 1: De¯nition of variables and their descriptive statistics.
Variable De¯nition ¹ ¾ N
Need 1 if the ¯rm needed a loan, else 0 0.61 0.49 5,022
Loan 1 if the ¯rm got a loan in 2002-2005, else 0 0.33 0.47 5,022
Interest interest rate charged, % 12.46 6.34 1,606
Term loan maturity in months 34.06 28.42 1,624
ForCurrency 1 if the loan is in foreign currency, else 0 0.16 0.37 1,729
Collateral 1 if collateral is required, else 0 0.82 0.39 1,729
Female 1 if the manager is female, else 0 0.27 0.44 5,022
Single 1 if the ¯rm consists of 0.83 0.37 5,017
a single establishment, else 0
Concentr % of sales from the main business activity 0.96 0.10 5,022
Competition 1 if the ¯rm faces four 0.78 0.41 4,769
or more competitors in 2002, else 0
CapUtil % of capacity utilization in 2002 0.83 0.19 4,904
Profit 1 if ¯rm was pro¯table in 2003, else 0 0.89 0.31 4,856
Age age of the ¯rm in 2002 8.75 7.71 5,017
Age2 age squared divided by 100 1.36 2.31 5,017
Communism 1 if the ¯rm was established 0.13 0.33 5,022
in the Soviet period, else 0
log(Labor) logarithm of the number of employees 2.10 1.33 4,975
City 1 if the ¯rm is in a capital or large 0.30 0.46 5,022
city (more than 1 mln), else 0
Subsidy 1 if the ¯rm received subsidies 0.05 0.22 5,022
RepSales % of sales reported 0.89 0.18 4,824
RepLabor % of workforce reported 0.91 0.17 4,840
Note: ¹ stands for the mean, ¾ for the standard deviation, and N for the number of observations.
25Table 2: Descriptive statistics by gender.
Male Female
¹ ¾ N ¹ ¾ N
Panel A: Financial variables
Need 0.62 0.48 3683 0.58 0.49 1339
Loan 0.35 0.48 3683 0.25 0.44 1339
Interest 12.18 6.28 1278 13.54 6.47 328
Term 34.15 28.36 1285 33.69 28.65 339
ForCurrency 0.16 0.37 1369 0.14 0.35 360
Collateral 0.82 0.38 1369 0.81 0.40 360
Panel B: Real variables
Single 0.82 0.38 3680 0.88 0.33 1337
Concentr 0.96 0.10 3683 0.97 0.09 1339
Competition 0.79 0.40 3500 0.75 0.43 1269
Capacity 0.83 0.19 3610 0.85 0.18 1294
Profit 0.90 0.30 3568 0.88 0.33 1288
Age 9.16 7.89 3680 7.61 7.09 1337
Age2 1.46 2.40 3680 1.08 2.01 1337
log(Labor) 2.25 1.36 3646 1.70 1.16 1329
Note: ¹ stands for the mean, ¾ for the standard deviation, and N for the number of observations.
26Table 3: Descriptive statistics by regions: Financial variables.
Male Female
¹ ¾ N ¹ ¾ N
Panel A: Old EU
Need 0.49 0.50 992 0.38 0.49 366
Loan 0.34 0.47 992 0.20 0.40 366
Interest 6.67 2.62 335 6.75 2.88 69
Term 49.62 32.54 322 53.31 34.12 71
ForCurrency 0.01 0.09 356 0.01 0.11 76
Collateral 0.75 0.44 356 0.74 0.44 76
Panel B: New EU
Need 0.66 0.47 830 0.57 0.50 348
Loan 0.37 0.48 830 0.24 0.43 348
Interest 10.65 4.59 295 10.50 4.60 80
Term 34.74 28.28 299 36.91 30.69 80
ForCurrency 0.13 0.34 320 0.13 0.34 85
Collateral 0.80 0.40 320 0.74 0.44 85
Panel C: South-Eastern Europe (SEE)
Need 0.71 0.45 627 0.66 0.47 176
Loan 0.43 0.49 627 0.34 0.48 176
Interest 12.51 5.89 271 14.34 6.15 57
Term 34.14 28.10 271 28.42 25.47 62
ForCurrency 0.31 0.46 283 0.21 0.41 63
Collateral 0.90 0.30 283 0.90 0.30 63
Panel D: Former Soviet Union (CIS)
Need 0.67 0.47 1234 0.71 0.46 449
Loan 0.31 0.46 1234 0.28 0.45 449
Interest 18.04 4.82 377 19.00 3.77 122
Term 21.03 15.72 393 23.19 17.48 126
ForCurrency 0.22 0.42 410 0.19 0.39 136
Collateral 0.86 0.35 410 0.84 0.37 136
Note: ¹ stands for the mean, ¾ for the standard deviation, and N for the number of observations.
27Table 4: Descriptive statistics by regions: Enterprise characteristics.
Male Female
¹ ¾ N ¹ ¾ N
Panel A: Old EU
Single 0.87 0.34 990 0.90 0.29 366
Concentr 0.98 0.07 992 0.99 0.05 366
Competition 0.82 0.38 965 0.80 0.40 354
Capacity 0.86 0.15 967 0.88 0.15 349
Profit 0.88 0.32 963 0.90 0.31 357
Age 12.82 9.54 992 9.90 8.90 365
log(Labor) 1.90 1.35 987 1.38 1.06 364
Panel B: New EU
Single 0.80 0.40 830 0.86 0.35 348
Concentr 0.95 0.11 830 0.97 0.08 348
Competition 0.89 0.31 791 0.88 0.33 321
Capacity 0.83 0.18 815 0.86 0.16 332
Profiti 0.90 0.30 819 0.85 0.36 336
Age 9.30 6.66 828 8.66 6.99 347
log(Labor) 2.12 1.35 815 1.65 1.14 344
Panel C: South-Eastern Europe (SEE)
Single 0.69 0.46 627 0.79 0.41 176
Concentr 0.95 0.11 627 0.96 0.10 176
Competition 0.80 0.40 590 0.76 0.43 161
Capacity 0.83 0.20 616 0.85 0.18 173
Profit 0.88 0.33 600 0.85 0.36 168
Age 8.67 6.61 627 6.76 4.61 176
log(Labor) 2.38 1.38 615 1.94 1.35 174
Panel D: Former Soviet Union (CIS)
Single 0.86 0.35 1233 0.90 0.30 447
Concentr 0.95 0.11 1234 0.95 0.11 449
Competition 0.70 0.46 1154 0.62 0.49 433
Capacity 0.79 0.22 1212 0.81 0.21 440
Profit 0.91 0.28 1186 0.89 0.31 427
Age 6.37 6.47 1233 5.28 5.35 449
log(Labor) 2.54 1.30 1229 1.91 1.11 447
Note: ¹ stands for the mean, ¾ for the standard deviation, and N for the number of observations.
28Table 5: Determinants of ¯nancial constraints.






























Note: Column (1) reports marginal e®ects after probit estimation. Column (2) reports OLS results.
Regressions include constant, City, Communism, industry and country dummy variables. Asymptotic
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal e®ects are estimated around mean points.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
29Table 6: Likelihood of obtaining a loan by region.
Dependent Variable: Loan
Old EU New EU SEE CIS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.061 -0.029 0.013 -0.087**
(0.039) (0.044) (0.049) (0.034)
Single -0.013 -0.084* -0.007 -0.083*
(0.046) (0.049) (0.044) (0.043)
Concentr -0.004 -0.276 -0.069 0.014
(0.184) (0.173) (0.182) (0.125)
Competition -0.049 -0.136*** 0.007 -0.016
(0.030) (0.050) (0.047) (0.031)
Capacity 0.291*** 0.015 -0.114 0.017
(0.091) (0.101) (0.110) (0.068)
Profit 0.021 0.151** 0.170*** 0.114**
(0.041) (0.067) (0.063) (0.053)
Age 0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Age2 -0.015 0.017 0.010 -0.034
(0.017) (0.028) (0.032) (0.026)
log(Labor) 0.023 0.103*** 0.054* 0.054***
(0.016) (0.023) (0.032) (0.017)
N 1,206 1,003 661 1,442
Â2 61.94*** 70.71*** 48.12*** 86.40***
½ -0.79* -0.77*** -0.91 -0.91***
Note: The table reports marginal e®ects after probit estimation. Regressions include constant, City,
Communism, industry and country dummy variables. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Marginal e®ects are estimated around mean points. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant
at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
30Table 7: Determinants of interest rates by region.
Dependent Variable: Interest
Old EU New EU SEE CIS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.526* -0.194 0.831 0.918**
(0.295) (0.541) (0.891) (0.419)
Term -0.005* -0.007 -0.016 -0.018*
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
ForCurrency 0.667 -0.075 -4.224*** -2.107***
(3.033) (0.729) (0.765) (0.480)
Collateral -0.083 -0.975* 0.778 1.437**
(0.296) (0.545) (1.229) (0.592)
Single -0.442 -0.251 0.942 0.885*
(0.310) (0.464) (0.605) (0.462)
Concentr -0.438 -1.398 -4.498* -0.955
(1.460) (1.704) (2.296) (1.443)
Competition -0.073 -0.354 0.235 -0.027
(0.270) (0.642) (0.800) (0.410)
Capacity -2.523*** 1.111 1.081 -1.371*
(0.719) (1.352) (1.748) (0.792)
Profit 0.241 -0.635 -1.270 0.057
(0.345) (0.655) (1.143) (0.645)
Age -0.073 -0.102 0.006 -0.050
(0.047) (0.094) (0.132) (0.093)
Age2 0.212 0.352 -0.244 -0.025
(0.139) (0.295) (0.476) (0.339)
log(Labor) -0.212*** -0.454*** 0.082 0.253
(0.080) (0.156) (0.270) (0.174)
N 344 325 280 449
R2 0.528 0.485 0.425 0.363
Note: Every equation includes constant, City, Communism, industry and country dummy variables.
Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at
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Figure 7: Average terms of loans in months by subsamples.
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